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Turing Machine Functionalism possesses the rare 
distinction among philosophical theories of having been 
definitely refuted. The decisive moment in its history 
came with the publication of "What Psychological States 
Are Not" 1 in which Med Block and Jerry Fodor pressed a 
number of technical objections against the theory. The 
Turing machine model of the mind had no place for 
dispositional predicates such as belief, it was incapa-
ble of distinguishing distinct simultaneous mental 
states and the type identity conditions it placed on 
mental states were both too fine-grained and too 
coarse-grained. Functionalism as a general approach to 
the philosophy of mind survived the demise of Turing 
Machine Functionalism, but one of the objections urged 
against the original theory still haunts its descend-
ants. Some mental states, most notably sensations, 
seem to untutored intuition to have a qualitative 
character which resists functional explanation. This 
is not a failure to be taken lightly. The qualitative 
character of mentality is a pervasive aspect of ex-
perience infusing our lives with depth, color and 
significance. A creature without a qualitative dimen-
sion to its existence might be able to behave as we do, 
but it is hard to see how it could care what happens to 
it. A philosophy which cannot capture the subjective, 
phenomenal side of mentality should point beyond itself 
to a more adequate theory. I will argue that current 
versions of functionalism fail to do justice to the 
quality of experience and that they do point beyond 
themselves to an account which stands a better chance 
of accommodating both the objective and subjective 
data. 
I 
There are many varieties of functionalism currently 
being defended and criticized, but the central doctrine 
binding these theories together can be put quite 
simply: mental states are to be individuated in terms 
of the abstract causal roles they play. This thesis is 
as important for what it denies as for what it asserts. 
It denies that to be in a certain type of mental state 
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is to be in any type of physical state. It denies that 
to be in a certain type of mental state is to be 
disposed to behave in a certain way. Both the mind-
brain identity theory and behaviorism are false on this 
theory, and for basically the same reason. Mental 
states are abstract in the sense that they are neutral 
with regard to the substance of the minds that have 
them. A mental state need not be realized by a brain 
state and a mind need not be embedded in a human body. 
The whole ontological issue of brain, soul or neutral 
substance is bypassed in favor of a characterization of 
the conditions which must be satisfied by any possible 
substance realizing mental properties. This feature of 
functionalism was inspired largely by the desire to as-
similate the insights arising out of recent work in ar-
tificial intelligence. What makes the activities of 
some computers so strikingly similar to human behavior 
is not the nuts and bolts of the physical machine but 
the program it executes. Since the same program can be 
executed by physically disparate computing machines, a 
certain type of physical structure cannot be essential 
to its operation. This negative insight of functional-
ism is its least controversial feature, although we 
will see reason to doubt it. 
On the positive side functionalists typically ex-
plicate the notion of an abstract causal role in terms 
of the causal relations a mental state bears to sensory 
inputs, behavioral outputs and predecessor and succes-
sor states internal to the system. Every mental state 
is thus implicitly defined in terms of its relations to 
other mental states and to its internal and external 
environment. The goal of functionalism can be seen as 
the elimination of the rough and ready mentalistic 
vocabulary of common sense psychology in favor of the 
formally precise language of the kind found in computer 
programming. 
The special difficulty that functionalist theories 
face with the qualitative character of sensations can 
now be put plainly. The functionalist program is to 
define mental states relationally, but I will argue 
that some mental states appear to have intrinsic 
properties. The felt phenomenological quality of the 
rich taste of strawberry shortcake or the feel of skin 
against fine fur are not plausibly construed as purely 
relational properties. Furthermore, the qualitative 
character of a sensation is often crucial to determin-
ing the kind of mental state that it is. Could any-
thing be a pain if it felt good, or looked yellow or 
had no qualitative character at all? At this point 
the functionalist may well respond that intuitions are 
easy to manipulate, particularly when the question is 
framed in such a rhetorical manner. Accordingly, it 
will be worthwhile to look at a couple of arguments 
which may provide a firmer guide to intuition. 
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II 
The first argument involves the familiar thought 
experiment of the inverted spectrum. Suppose it were 
the case that objective colors (wavelengths reflected 
by objects) were systematically mapped for different 
people onto different subjective colors (the way wave-
lengths appear to perceptual consciousness). If all 
the similarity relations between subjective colors were 
preserved, 2 so that red and green remained at opposite 
ends of the color wheel for example, then it is possi-
ble that with respect to color strawberries look to me 
the way grass looks to you. If the qualitative charac-
ter of perception is essential to the type identity of 
perceptual states then you and I are in different men-
tal states when we look at strawberries. Functionalism 
does not seem to have the resources available for cap-
turing the difference. Our sensory inputs may be the 
same and our behavioral outputs also might match, and 
if all the difference and betweenness relations between 
subjective colors are preserved by the mapping, then my 
mental state might play the same causal role in the in-
ternal economy of my mind as your mental state plays in 
yours. 
The inverted qualia argument has been around at 
least as long as Locke's Essay 1 and there are a number 
of standard objections to it. Old-style verification-
ist theories of meaning have long since been discre-
dited but the feeling lingers on that a proposal upon 
which no possible evidence could bear must be empty at 
best. As the situation was described, whenever a per-
son whose spectrum had been inverted saw anything red 
it would look green to him, but since he has been 
taught to call things of that color 'red' he would 
speak in the same way as the rest of us. No one would 
ever know he was any different. On the other hand, if 
we do countenance the logical possibility of spectrum 
inversion an intolerable skepticism about other minds 
seems to follow. If I cannot know which color my 
friend sees when he looks at a tomato then how can I 
know what he feels when he burns his hand? Perhaps 
what feels like a burn to me feels like an ache or a 
cut to him. Once the possibility is admitted for 
colors there seems to be no way to prevent it from un-
dermining our faith in other minds generally. 
The temptation to deny the logical possibility of 
spectrum inversion has often proved irresistable, and 
subtle arguments have been advanced to show that the 
idea is incoherent.* I will not take the time to ex-
amine these arguments because I don't think it is 
necessary. Instead, consider for a moment the possi-
bility of intra-subjective spectrum inversion. You 
wake up tomorrow morning and things which looked red 
yesterday look green to you today. This change would 
be detectable. You would probably complain loudly 
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about this unwelcome turn of events. Nor could your 
complaints be put down to some sort of linguistic con-
fusion since it could easily show up in your behavior 
as well. You might drive through flashing red lights 
for example. If it is at least logically possible that 
this could happen to a person at some time in his life, 
then what contradiction would be generated by supposing 
that he has been in this condition his entire life; or 
that he develops a case of amnesia shortly after his 
experience of spectum inversion? 
A second line of argument open to defenders of 
functionalism would be to claim that, although the sit-
uation described is logically possible, it is nomologi-
cally impossible for functionally identical psychologi-
cal states to differ in their qualitative character.* 
Perhaps there is a mapping which preserves the smooth 
transitions from one color to another, but the burden 
of proof would seem to be upon proponents of the argu-
ment to show that there is a mapping with the required 
properties. Although I think that logical possibility 
is all the inverted qualia argument strictly requires, 
it is important to recognize that this objection to the 
argument often expresses the feeling that fanciful 
thought-experiments carry little weight in the face of 
an attractive theory. All sorts of extravagant circum-
stances may be imagined, but in the absence of any 
relevant empirical data a theory should be judged by 
its actual successes and failures. 
This attitude is understandable but nevertheless 
misguided. The case is described in the extreme form 
of fully inverted spectra in order to make vivid the 
failure of functionalism to capture a salient aspect of 
our mental life. More modest qualitative disparities 
are equally good counter-examples to any purely rela-
tional theory. Suppose I have a defect in my cornea 
which imparts a yellowish tinge to my visual field. If 
a bout with jaundice can produce this condition, why 
couldn't someone be born with jaundice-like vision? Or 
perhaps the color wheel that describes your subjective 
color perception is shifted 2° to the right of the cor-
responding color wheel of normal human beings. How 
plausible is the strong thesis that functional identity 
entails qualitative identity? In all likelihood, 
descrepancies between subjective quality spaces are ac-
tual and rather common. 
Functionalists who accept the possibility of in-
verted qualia are not entirely without resources. Many 
simply relegate the qualitative character of sensations 
to some discipline other than psychology and confine 
their theory to the more cognitive aspects of mental-
ity. I have no quarrel with this strategy, but it is 
important to realize its cost: the attempt to elimi-
nate mentalistic language from a mature psychology 
would have to be abandoned. Many cognitive states 
would have to be partially defined in terms of their 
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causal relations to unreconstructed sensations, both 
because sensations often give rise to cognitive states 
and also because many beliefs, desires and intentions 
take representations of sensations as their content. 
Nevertheless, a more modest functionalism is still an 
attractive and potentially powerful theory. A func-
tionalist theory* which defined the sensation of blue, 
for example, as (a) having some qualitative character 
(b) systematically situated in a quality space such 
that (c) its presence reliably signals the presence of 
objective blue in the environment would be both in-
formative and open to indefinite refinement. The 
disadvantage of such a theory is, of course, that it 
leaves the predicate "has qualitative character" unde-
fined. 
We are now in a position to provide a partial an-
swer to the skeptical doubts the inverted qualia argu-
ment inspires. The first point to notice is that it is 
not true that no possible evidence could bear upon the 
truth of this hypothesis. In the case of intra-
subjective spectrum inversion the most natural explana-
tion of the situation would be that the neural mechan-
ism which formerly took objective red into subjective 
red now takes objective red into subjective blue. A 
fancy brain scan could confirm the hypothesis which 
then could be used to test for inter-subjective spec-
turm inversion. We will have occasion to return to the 
suggestion that the realization of a functional theory 
is the proper level of description for qualitative 
states, but it may be objected at this point that evi-
dence which is not currently available can hardly ex-
plain our confidence in ascribing mental states to 
other people. Part of the answer to this objection can 
be found in the functionalist theory just sketched. 
The fact that other people exhibit similar behavioral 
responses to color stimulation is evidence for an 
isomorphism between quality space matrices. Whatever 
may be the intrinsic character of the sensations of 
other people, we at least know that their sensations 
are systematically related in a way which mirrors the 
relations which hold in our own case. Beyond this, I 
think that the skeptical doubts are justified. 
Different people probably do perceive the world diff-
erently and the nature of the difference is likely to 
remain hidden. 
Ill 
The second argument is related to the first and can 
be more briefly stated. If functionalism has no 
resources for representing qualitative similarity and 
difference, how can it represent the contrast between a 
creature whose internal states have no qualitative 
character at all and the kind of richly qualitative 
mental life with which we are all familiar? It seems 
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that the intrinsic features of mental events could slip 
through a relational net entirely undetected. Imagine 
a case in which the biochemical equivalents of gears 
and pulleys determine the transition probabilities from 
state to state and ultimately overt behavior. Such an 
individual would be an imitation man, mimicking human 
life and creating the illusion of mentality where there 
is none. 
This possibility is generally considered to be more 
damaging to functionalism than the possibility of in-
verted qualia, and functionalists have been quick to 
deny its intelligibility. One well-known argument 7 
against the possibility of absent qualia can be stated 
succinctly. In order for alleged, cases of absent 
qualia to be a counter-example to functionalism, quali-
tative states can have no causal relations to other 
mental states. Qualitative states do give rise to 
beliefs about qualitative states, they are often 
motives for action, etc. Therefore the absence of 
qualitative states would be detected by an adequate 
functionalist theory. 
This objection misconstrues the point of the origi-
nal argument. Clearly, qualitative states do play a 
prominent role in our mental lives, but this role, as 
the functionalist has defined it, could very well be 
filled by some other mechanism wholly lacking in quali-
tative character. Both the absent qualia argument and 
the inverted qualia argument can be seen as making the 
same point, i.e., that functionalism neglects some of 
the causal consequences of the normal operation of the 
system and some of these consequences may well be 
relevant to how a specific realization of the func-
tional theory fills the abstract role in question. For 
example, a functionalist theory of the generation of 
electricity may well be neutral with respect to whether 
the electricity is generated by a hydroelectric or by a 
nuclear process. However, the use of uranium as op-
posed to water can have dramatic causal consequences 
which would not be captured by this functionalist 
account. Likewise, in making the notion of abstract 
causal role constitutive of mental states, functional-
ism has pitched its analysis at too abstract a level. 
A theory of abstract causal roles by its very nature 
selects from among the causal consequences of a process 
those consequences which are relevant to the succession 
of states. 
A psychological theory which brought into clear 
focus the perceptual mechanisms employed by known sen-
tient creatures would nicely complement the abstract 
functionalism we have been discussing. Fortunately, a 
thriving model for such a theory can be found in func-
tional explanation in biology. The patterns of expla-
nation found in evolutionary biology suitably adapted 
to the subject matter of psychology, could supply a 
much needed element of empirical content to the formal 
223 
structure of abstract functionalism. I will now brief-
ly state what I take to be the principal components* of 
functional explanation in biology and also indicate how 
this explanatory framework can be brought to bear upon 
the issue at hand. 
(1) For the purposes of functional explanation, only 
causal consequences need be considered, but since our 
metaphysics presupposes an ontology of individuals, it 
will be more natural to speak of an item and what it 
does. The point to notice here is that more than one 
item can engage in the same activity. If two or more 
items have the same causal consequences they are said 
to be functionally equivalent. This aspect of func-
tional explanation in biology is similar to the nega-
tive insight of abstract functionalism discussed 
earlier, although it should be noted that the con-
straints placed upon functional equivalence are much 
stronger here. 
(2) In system S the causal consequences of an activity 
must be computed within the context of the containing 
system, if any. The competing demands of other compo-
nents in an instantiated system will often force trade-
offs in efficiency. Optimal design for any component 
of a system cannot be assumed. 
(3) Relative to enrironment E the interaction of the 
system with the outside world must be factored into the 
derivation of causal consequences. Since a system 
needs to deploy its resources as efficiently as possi-
ble, the demands placed upon it by the environment will 
shape the configuration of its component parts. 
(4) Relative to purpose P not all the consequences of 
an activity will be functional within the system. The 
function of the heart, for example, is to circulate the 
blood, but the activity of the heart also has non-
functional consequences (heart sounds) and dysfunc-
tional consequences (heart attacks). The introduction 
of a purpose provides a device for distinguishing 
between the function of an item and its other causal 
consequences. The use of teleological language need 
not involve an appeal to consciousness, entelechies, 
vital processes or anything of the sort. All that the 
use of "purpose" entails is that the system is the pro-
duct of a selection mechanism of some kind. In biology 
this role is played by natural selection and if natural 
selection can be reduced without explanatory loss to 
the operation of mechanistic forces than talk of pur-
poses will be in a sense eliminable. In any case, the 
use of purpose-laden language is both indispensible as 
a practical matter and oritologically harmless if rela-
tivized to some fully causal selection process. 
A functionalism guided by the biological model of 
explanation will take as its proper object some partic-
ular system or kind of system. One would expect nat-
urally evolved systems such as human beings to have 
roughly the kind of mental states they ought to have 
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given their epistemic needs, the demands of the en-
vironment and the cognitive resources at their 
disposal. Broadly speaking, the purposes served by 
sensations are to allow the system to extract informa-
tion about how the world is impinging upon its body and 
about the present state of equilibrium in its body. 
But it is not enough merely to extract the information. 
The information must be presented to the relevant sub-
system in a form in which it can be sorted, processed 
and used. 
Any information flow requires some channel through 
which it is represented. Information just is the 
structuring of some channel. Now, the flow of informa-
tion can be studied from two quite different perspec-
tives. One may concentrate on the amount and type of 
information to which the system has access and the ways 
in which the information is utilized and affects the 
succession of internal states. This is the project 
which abstract functionalism is best suited to handle. 
Or, one may focus upon the properties of the channel in 
which information is embedded. This is the domain of 
the more concrete functionalism we are now considering. 
Abstract functionalism will impose some constraints on 
the character of the channel. The channel must be 
relatively free from noise and equivocation for 
example. It must be a clear channel 9 in the sense that 
the channel either adds no new information or adds only 
redundant information. Beyond this it is necessary to 
look at the specific mechanism which carries the in-
formation and the broad systemic constraints imposed 
upon it. One possibility in the case of sensations is 
to view the qualitative character of sensations as the 
encoding channel through which the encoded information 
is presented to consciousness. 1 0 The distinctive 
character of each sensory modality could be attributed 
to the character of the channel in which the relevant 
information was embedded. The distinctive character of 
a given sensation would in turn be explained in terms 
of the encoding principles of the channel in question. 
In the case of pain the categories of throbbing, cut-
ting, aching and burning together with various levels 
of intensity and shading between pure types could serve 
as channel conditions through which information is 
transmitted. Clearly, much more would need to be said 
before this suggestion could be fairly evaluated, but 
being programmatic is not in itself a defect. If a 
proposal is free from conceptual confusion and promises 
to uncover heretofore hidden relationships then it is 
worthy of careful attention. 
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IV 
It may be objected at this point that whatever the 
virtues of examining the instantiations of functional-
ist theories, this approach will shed no more light 
upon the quality of experience than its more abstract 
cousin. John Searle is one philosopher who is keenly 
aware of the inability of theories of a functionalist 
stripe to capture what he calls intrinsic mentality. 
One of his more recent inventions is the argument from 
anesthesia. 1 1 Searle asks us to assume that function-
alists have provided a complete specification of the 
causal role of pain in relation of all possible inputs, 
outputs and successor states. We may add that the 
ideal functionalist theory takes due account of the 
broad systemic constraints imposed by its instantiation 
in human beings. The theory is recast in the form of a 
computer program or machine table description and com-
mitted to memory by some person. That person is then 
subjected to anesthesia and asked to mentally rehearse 
the sequence of states which the theory defines as a 
searing burning sensation. If he has performed his 
task flawlessly, Searle claims that our anesthetized 
person will be an instantiation of an ideal functional-
ist theory of pain yet fail to have the mental states 
the theory ascribes to him. 
This case is similar to the absent qualia argument, 
but I think that it is easier to see where this argu-
ment goes wrong. A functionalist theory of pain will 
include a description of states X, Y, Z and the transi-
tion probabilities between them. As instantiated, X, 
Y, Z may correspond to diminished attention span, lay-
ing down memory traces and initiation of aversive 
responses. In contrast our anesthetized friend goes 
through a series of mental states but not the right 
ones. The occurant mental states he has are represen-
tations which take as their content functionalist 
descriptions of pain and are not to be identified with 
the sequence of states to which a functionalist theory 
is committed. The representational mental states a, b, 
c, (not equal to) X, Y, Z are wholly unsuited to play 
the causal role played by pain states. Consequently, 
the imagined case is no counter-example to a serious 
functi ona1i sm. 
Searle recommends insisting upon the first-person 
perspective when talking to functionalists. It is only 
from this point of view that the elusive quality of 
what it is like to be someone can be seen as the chal-
lenge to functionalist theories of mind that it 1B . 
Searle is absolutely right about this, but for the 
wrong reasons. To have a first-person perspective of 
the causal role of a pain state is to be a participant 
in the causal nexus in which the pain state is 
produced. In order to know what it is like to be a bat 
one must first become a bat and this is a transforma-
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tion which no mere theory can perform. It is tempting 
to view the world from the eyes of Berkeley's God, as a 
wholly representational structure explainable without 
residue within some theoretical framework. But the 
world is not a theoretical construct; rather it is an 
arena of immediate causal interactions, and for creat-
ures with the right kind of internal structure these 
interactions give rise to immediate qualitative 
experience. Functionalism may give us some insight 
into the requisite kind of internal structure, but no 
theory can ever put us literally into someone else's 
mind. 
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